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THE VOLKSGEIST AND A PIECE OF SULPHUR
Frank W. Elliott*
Savigny was a principal architect of the historical theory of jurisprudence
which holds that law must be consonant with the spirit of the people it
governs. In his own times, however, he was more than a philosopher. As
a participant in a great debate, Savigny developed his theory as a weapon
to resist the wholesale imposition of a legal code which he regarded as
alien to and ill suited for the emerging German states. Professor Elliott
explores the thought of this controversial man in a fashion which is of in-
terest not only to the philosopher and historian, but also to the lawyer
who practices in an age, like Savigny's, preoccupied with the adoption of
uniform legal codes.
In 1814 a remarkable little volume appeared on the German legal and
academic scene. It aroused great controversy, accomplished its intended
purpose for over eighty years, and is still being discussed. The book was
Ueber den Beruf unserer Zeit fuer Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissen-
schaft,1 [translated as Of the Vocation of Our Age for Legislation and
Jurisprudence (hereinafter referred to as Vocation)] its author was
Friedrich Carl von Savigny, and its purpose was to prevent the impending
codification of German law. It has been said that it was written in "white
heat' ' 2 and, on the contrary, that it was written as a preface to a larger
work,3 Die Geschichte des Roemischen Rechts im Mittelalter.4 Whatever
the purpose of its composition, there is no doubt that it was published as
an argumentative reply to the demand for codification. Many of its ideas
* Associate Professor of Law, The University of Texas.
'SAVIGNY, UnER Dm BERuJF UNsEai ZEIT FuER GESETZGEBuNG UND RECHTSWISSEN-
scmtrT (1814), translated as SAVIGNY, OF THE VOCATIoN oF OuR AGE FOR LEGISLATiON
AND JURISPRUDENCE (2d ed. Hayward transl. 1831) (hereinafter cited as VOCATION). A
word of explanation on the lengthy quotations from the Vocation and other of Savigny's
works is in order. Copies of the Hayward translation are rare, and copies of the trans-
lations of the other works are almost non-existent. Therefore, unless the reader has the
ability to read German, first-hand knowledge of Savigny's theory is difficult to obtain.
There are fairly extensive excerpts from the Vocation in MoaiUs, THE GREAT LEGAL
PHnosoPHEs (1959), but they are far from a complete exposition of the theory.
2 PATrEmsoN, JURISPRUDF.cCE 410 (1953).
3 Kantorowicz, Savigny and the Historical School of Law, 53 L.Q. Rnv. 326, 340
(1937).
4 SAVIGNy, DIE GESCEIC=TE DES RoEmISCIEN RECHTS XM MITTEL.iTE (1815-1831)
(The History of Roman Law in the Middle Ages).
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were repeated, somewhat more calmly, in the System des Heutigen Roe-
mischen Rechts.5
Savigny's basic theory is that it is impossible to create law out of whole
cloth-it grows in a slow, unconscious, organic way from its primitive be-
ginning in the minds of the people of a nation.
In the earliest times to which authentic history extends, the law will
be found to have already attained a fixed character, peculiar to the
people, like their language, manners and constitution. Nay, these
phenomena have no separate existence, they are but the particular
faculties and tendencies of an individual people, inseparably united
in nature, and only wearing the semblance of distinct attributes to
our view. That which binds them into one whole is the common con-
viction of the people, the kindred consciousness of an inward neces-
sity, excluding all notion of an accidental and arbitrary origin.6
This "common conviction," this "kindred consciousness," this "inward
necessity" came to be known as the Volksgeist. The theory is as elemental
as the early belief that all matter is composed of earth, air, fire, and wa-
ter; perhaps as attractive as that belief; and certainly as false when con-
sidered as an absolute. Surely law can be consciously created; the state
of legislation today cannot be ignored. Not all law is purely national in
origin and development. The progress of evolution shows a general conti-
nuity of experience, but man can check, or at least divert, the march of
history. But it is not necessary to consider the theory as indivisible and
thereby be led to reject it completely. There is much in Savigny's writ-
ings worth keeping.
Though legislation can be effective, distrust of legislation is shared by
many. "There is, indeed, a science of legislation; but though allied to the
science of jurisprudence, it does not include it, and is quite different from
it.... Legislation is, in one aspect, the opposite of jurisprudence .... "1
"The truth is that many of us, bred in common law traditions, view stat-
utes with a distrust which we may deplore, but not deny."8 Of course,
Savigny would not deplore the distrust, but rather applaud it.
It validly can be asked where the kindred consciousness of inward nec-
essity for the Rule in Shelley's Case may be found. But it can just as
validly be answered:
5 SAVIGNY, SYSTEMx DEs HE-UTIGEN ROFMXSCIIEN lkcn 3s (1840) (System of Moden
Roman Law).
6 VocATIoN 24.
7 CARTER, THE PnoviNcEs OF THE WRITTEN AND THE UNWRITTEN LAW 4 (1889).
8 CARDozo, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 9 (1927).
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No lawgiver meditating a code of laws conceived the system of
feudal tenures. History built up the system and the law that went
with it. Never by a process of logical deduction from the idea of ab-
stract ownership could we distinguish the incidents of an estate in
fee simple from those of an estate for life, or those of an estate for
life from those of an estate for years. Upon these points, 'a page of
history is worth a volume of logic.' 9
What, then, is the nucleus of the idea which remains today as accept-
able and perhaps accepted? What is left of the theory when its incon-
sistencies, its exaggerations, its prejudices, are stripped from it? The
search for such a nucleus is the purpose of this paper. Little if any atten-
tion will be paid to the great fight over codification, even though the Vo-
cation was published as a weapon in that fight, and Savigny was a pas-
sionate participant in it throughout his life. Emphasis will rather be
placed on his theory of the historical origin and development of the law,
and the part of that theory which may still have some value for us.
I. ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT
Some of the criticism of the Volksgeist theory has been based on the
fact that dominant minority groups many times have been more influen-
tial in molding the law than the common feeling of a nation as a whole.
It is difficult to conceive of a mass of inhabitants clamoring for the yoke
of the feudal system. There could be little felt necessity for specific rules
of the law merchant. But a caveat must be inserted here. Savigny was
speaking initially of a nation in its youth, developing its primitive rules.
These rules were communicated by word of mouth, by symbolical acts.10
If the system of land tenure and common law conveyancing did spring
full grown from a lawgiver, I cannot believe that the name of such a
diabolical genius would have been lost in antiquity. Certainly we cannot
say that the young nation lay awake nights yearning for an estate in fee
tail male, or inwardly felt that a conveyance of Pinkacre to A for life
with remainder to his heirs should be considered as a conveyance to A
in fee simple. But perhaps there was some feeling for the right of free
disposition of property, and the symbolical passing of twigs or stones in
livery of seisin seems to fit within Savigny's description very well.
Let us go beyond the caveat, however, and examine the case of the law
merchant. Just because the entire population does not have a common
9 CAnwozo, THE NATUrE oF THE JuDicALn PRocEss 54 (1921).
10 VocATio 26, 130.
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conviction, is this to say that the general idea is worthless? If the law de-
velops through the customs and practices of specialized groups, and that
development applies to that group, some of the thought clearly has merit.
Although it may not be strict Savigny, it is feasible to consider a Volks-
geist of the merchant class, the only group that really has a deep interest
in certain specific problems.
In addition, and to return to the caveat, Savigny realized that as the
nation matured, as civilization progressed, so did the law. "[H] e supple-
mented his 'popular spirit' origin with the theory that the jurists (legal
scholars including professors and judges), who become legal specialists
with the advance of civilization, are the representatives of the community
spirit and are thus authorized to carry on the law in its technical as-
pects.""3- This concept is not without its own critics, and is not posed here
as an answer to the present question. It will be discussed at greater length
in the next section.
Even if we assume that the Volksgeist is merely superstition, we must
admit that history, the slow, perhaps unguided movement of time, has
played an important part in the birth and growth of the law.
[I]f we consider the law of contract we find it full of history. The
distinctions between debt, convenant and assumpsit are merely his-
torical. The classification of certain obligations to pay money, im-
posed by the law irrespective of any bargain as quasi-contracts, is
merely historical. The doctrine of consideration is merely historical.
The effect given to a seal is to be explained by history alone.
12
At this point, one may ask, and rightly so, "So what? Does that make
it right and proper? If this is all that the theory shows or does, what is its
worth?" Savigny has been severely criticized for allegedly believing that
the primitive customs and attitudes of a people should have primacy over
later developments, 3 and for tending to advocate the perpetuation of
what has grown up historically, even if it has ceased to have any rational
purpose.14 In short, it is alleged that he does not believe in a living, grow-
ing law. Even the critics, however, concede that he gave at least lip service
to the contrary.15 This is what he said:
For law.., there is no moment of absolute cessation; it is subject
to the same movement and development as every other popular
SPArrmSON, op. cit. supra note 2, at 411-12.
2 Hohnes, The Path of the Law, 10 HA{v. L. REv. 457,472 (1897).
1
3 PTrTEsoN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 414.
'14STOrNE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNcrION oF THE LAxv 445-46 (1950).
15 See id. at 445-47.
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tendency; and this very development remains under the same law of
inward necessity, as in its earliest stages. Law grows with the
growth, and strengthens with the strength of the people.36
The historical view of jurisprudence is entirely misunderstood and
distorted when it is regarded as setting up the law which has de-
scended to us from the past as supreme, and requiring the mainten-
ance of its unimpaired authority over the present and the future.
The essential characteristic is rather the equal recognition of the
value and independence of each age, and it merely lays the chief
weight on the recognition of the organic connection between the
present and the past, without the knowledge of which we can only
perceive the external appearance of existing legal institutions, but
cannot understand their true essence.'
7
Lip service indeed! Throughout his works the law is noted as some-
thing organic, something dynamic. The law does not stop growing until a
nation in its dotage starts to wither away, and then so does the law.' s
Holmes has compared the development of the law to that of plant-mind,
like matter, simply obeying a law of spontaneous growth. 9 Savigny has
compared it to the growth of a member of a human body, "not as a gar-
ment merely that has been made to please the fancy and can be taken off
at pleasure and exchanged for another."20
The accusation that Savigny is interested only in the primitive rules
calls for a further comparison at this point.21 I hope the reader will find
the parallel in these passages that I did.
History must be a part of the study, because without it we cannot
know the precise scope of rules which it is our business to know. It is
a part of the rational study, because it is the first step toward an en-
lightened skepticism, that is, towards a deliberate reconsideration
of the worth of those rules. When you get the dragon out of his cave
on to the plain and in the daylight, you can count his teeth and
claws, and see just what is his strength. But to get him out is only
16 VocATIoN 27.
27 Preface to SAV1GNY, SYSTEM OF MODERN ROMrAN LAw (1840), quoted in Guthrie,
Introduction to SAVIGNY, PRIVATZ INTERNATIONAL LAW at 13 (2d ed. Guthrie transl.
1880).
'8V VocATxoN 27.
19 Holmes, supra note 12, at 468.
20 SAVIGNY, PRiVATE INTEnNATioNAL LAW 530 (2d ed. Guthrie transl. 1880).
211 have explained in note 1 why there are so many extensive quotations of Savigny.
It may be wise to explain now why there are also other extensive quotations. First, the
men who I quote are famous for the clarity and quality of their writing. Second, an-
cillary to the first, I cannot hope to match by paraphrase what they have said. And
third, I quote because to paraphrase might lead to complaints of inaccuracy, and I want
to show that Savigny is not so esoteric and ancient as has been thought. Of course, I
can still be accused of quoting out of context, but I will bear that burden if it comes.
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the first step. The next is either to kill him, or to tame him and make
him a useful animal.... It is revolting to have no better reason for
a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV.
It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down
have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind
imitation of the past.
22
There is consequently no mode of avoiding this overruling in-
fluence of the existing matter; it will be injurious to us so long as we
ignorantly submit to it; but beneficial, if we oppose to it a vivid cre-
ative energy,--obtain the mastery over it by a thorough grounding
in history, and thus appropriate to ourselves the whole intellectual
wealth of preceding generations.... Its object is to trace every estab-
lished system to its root, and thus discover an organic principle,
whereby that which still has life, may be separated from that which
is lifeless and only belongs to history.
23
Patterson has suggested that the latter sentence could be taken to
state the role of the courts in Anglo-American law.2 4 I submit that
Savigny is just as interested in killing or taming the dragon as is Holmes.
And to what does this mastery over history lead?
We must beware of the pitfall of antiquarianism, and must re-
member that for our purposes our only interest in the past is for the
light it throws upon the present. I look forward to a time when the
part played by history in the explanation of dogma shall be very
small, and instead of ingenious research we shall spend our energy
on a study of the ends sought to be attained and the reasons for de-
siring them.
2 5
Let jurisprudence be once generally diffused amongst the jurists
... and we again possess, in the legal profession, a subject for living
customary law,-consequently, for real improvement .... The his-
torical matter of law, which now hems us in on all sides, will then
be brought under subjection, and constitute our wealth. We shall
then possess a truly national law, and a powerful expressive lan-
guage will not be wanting to it. We may then give up the Roman
law to history, and we shall have, not merely a feeble imitation of
the Roman system, but a truly national and new system of our own.2 6
In short, some of the alleged errors in Savigny's work are like the
troubles of Samuel Clemens-they never happened. To one reading "a
copy of the rare English translation of Savigny's writing,"27 and that
22 Holmes, supra note 12, at 469.
2 3 VocAaoN 137.
24 PATTRS0N, op. cit. supra note 2, at 412.
25 Holmes, supra note 12, at 474.
26 VocAToN 154-55.
27 Kantorowicz, supra note 3, at 332 n.21.
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only, it becomes even more apparent. Whatever he may have done later,
whatever he may have taught his students in the university, it remains
that his conception of the law as expressed in the Vocation and in the
System of Modern Roman Law was not that of a reactionary, static,
tradition-bound body of primitive rules.
There is another, and perhaps more telling criticism. To believe that
all law develops without arbitrary origin, gradually, unconsciously, but
in the kindred consciousness of a people, is to ignore reality. In wholly
primitive stages of a nation's life it possibly could be so; but except for
such a situation, a tenuous one at best, at least some law has been created
by conscious effort. Kantorowicz has suggested that all law has been so
created.28 Even customary law has passed through "the brains of prophets,
sages, doomsmen, judges, advocates, and notaries, who formulate and
apply it, and thus gradually separate it from mere usages and from ethi-
cal rules."29
Jhering, at first a follower of the historical school, later came to be-
lieve that the progress of the law is not merely the result of unconscious
growth, but also the result of conscious attempts to solve social problems
-an activity directed toward aims, receiving its orientation not only
from the past, but from the future.30
Cardozo, to whom I shall return in a later discussion, first mentions
Savigny and his work in a tentative way, expressing the problem of con-
scious effort very well.
Savigny's conception of law as something realized without struggle
or aim or purpose, a process of silent growth, the fruition in life and
manners of a people's history and genius, gives a picture incomplete
and partial. It is true if we understand it to mean that the judge in
shaping the rules of law must heed the mores of his day. It is one-
sided and therefore false in so far as it implies that the mores of the
day automatically shape rules which, full grown and ready made,
are handed to the judge.... Law is, indeed, an historical growth,
for it is an expression of customary morality which develops silently
and unconsciously from one age to another. That is the great truth
in Savigny's theory of its origin. But law is also a conscious or pur-
posed growth, for the expression of customary morality will be false
unless the mind of the judge is directed to the attainment of the
moral end and its embodiment in legal forms. Nothing less than
conscious effort will be adequate if the end in view is to prevail. The
standards or patterns of utility and morals will be found by the
28 Id. at 334.
29 Id. at 335.
30 VnoGronI, HISTORiCAL JUrisPRDmcN 135 (1923).
1964]
judge in the life of the community. They will be found in the same
way by the legislator. That does not mean, however, that the work





Still unanswered to some extent is the claim that Savigny gave only
lip service to the idea of growth and change in the law. It is said that he
has not shown how it grows. "If the law evolves the historical school
must tell us how it evolves; if it is incapable of that, or refuses to do it,
that is tantamount to saying that it ceases to be a juristic school, since it is
powerless to furnish a creative method. '32 I believe, however, that
Savigny has told us how, or at least has laid a predicate for finding how.
As has been briefly mentioned, he carried his theory beyond the primitive
state of a nation. In this way he provided, or it can be argued that he pro-
vided, a way in which the law does grow. As civilization progresses, what
otherwise would have remained common becomes appropriated to par-
ticular classes.
The law, originally the common property of the collected people,
in consequence of the ramifying relations of real life, is so developed
in its details that it can no more be mastered by the people gener-
ally. Then a separate class of legal experts is formed which, itself
an element of the people, represents the community in this domain
of thought. In the special consciousness of this class, the law is only
a continuation and peculiar development of the Volksrecht. The last
leads, henceforth, a double life. In its fundamental principles it
continues to live in the common consciousness of the people; the
exact determination and the application to details is the special call-
ing of the class of juristconsults.
33
This, according to Savigny, explains how even the immense detail of
mature laws rises from organic causes, still without any exertion of ar-
31 
CAIMOZO, op. cit. supra note 9, at 104-05.
3 2 Saleilles, L'Ecole Historique et Droit Naturel 1 REvUE TiumESTRIELLE DE DnOIT
Civ 80, quoted in STONE, op. cit. supra note 14, at '47.
33 SAVIGNY, op. cit. supra note 17, at S 14. See also VOCATION 28. An interesting par-
allel may be found in Moslem legal theory. One of the roots of Islamic law is jima'
(consensus). Such consensus was reckoned to be of two kinds: consensus of the whole
community, and consensus of the leaders, or great law teachers. See KrHADDU I & Line-
EsNY, LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST 87, 95 (1955). The distinction betwen the two forms
is remarkably similar to Savigny's political and technical dichotomy.
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bitrary will or intention. He classifies the dual life of the law as being
made up of the "political" element-the connection of law with the gen-
eral existence of the people; and the "technical" element-the distinct
scientific existence of law.
3 4
The general theory is difficult to master. Kantorowicz called it "fantas-
tic," and excused it, "perhaps," by Savigny's love for Roman law and his
necessity for explaining how it became a part of the German Volksgeist35
He went on to regret that neither Savigny nor his followers had ever
fully developed the idea, and this regret may be shared by all. Was this
one of the cases of direct representation allowed by Roman law? Was it a
"queer case of agency in contract"? No matter, it is denominated as
"brittle" and left.3 6
John Chipman Gray posed a situation which could not be answered
without the concept of jurist-representation, then sought to show that the
concept itself gave no answer. Most law, he says, is unknown to the
people. Suppose that a contract by letter is not complete in Massachusetts
until the answer is received, but in New York it is complete when the
answer is mailed. Is the common consciousness of the people of Massa-
chusetts different from that of the people of New York? Does the popula-
tion of one state feel the necessity of one thing as law, while the popula-
tion of another feel the necessity of the opposite? Of course, he continues,
not one man in a hundred has the foggiest notion of what the law is or
what he feels about it, and the one who may have a notion is likely to be
wrong.3
7
This seems to be a fair criticism as far as it goes, with some answer
given by another theory of Savigny, which is a digression from the pres-
ent discussion, and shall be banished to a footnote.3 8 But what of the
representation theory? Gray maintains it is groundless. In common law
countries it is less absurd, but in Germany, and other nations of similar
3 4 VocArioN 28.
35 Kantorowicz, supra note 3, at 338.
36 Id. at 338-39.
37GRAY, THE NATURE AND SouRcEs OF THE Lx.%v 90-91 (2d ed. 1927).
3 8
1n answer to the complaint of great diversity in German provincial laws, Savigny
said: "The well-being of every organic being, (consequently of states), depends on the
maintenance of an equipoise between the whole and its parts-on each having its due."
Law merits praise when it coincides with the feelings of the people; blame if it leaves
the people without participation. "No state of law appears more favourable than...
great variety and individuality in particulars, but with the common law for the general
foundation." VOCATION 59. Apparently the law of the several states of the United States
would be viewed favorably by Savigny.
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legal background, it is almost impossible to believe that the writings of the
unofficial and undeterminate class of "jurists," from which so much of
the law has been derived, express the opinions of the people.
The jurists set forth the opinions of the people no more and no
less than any other specially educated or trained class in a commun-
ity set forth the opinions of that community, each in its own sphere.
... It might be very desirable that the conceptions of the Volksgeist
should be those of the most skillful of the community, but however
desirable this might be, it is not the case. The Volksgeist carries a
piece of sulphur in its waistcoat pocket to keep off rheumatism, and
thinks that butchers cannot sit on juries.3 9
Other writers have accepted Savigny's explanation, or at least have
been more charitable in their treatment of it. "What has been the great
factor in the creation of the Mercantile Law?" asks one, then answers:
Not legislative intervention: our Mercantile Law has been the prod-
uct almost entirely of custom and judicial decision, and in the
various stages of its history it has moulded and adjusted itself with
the most remarkable sensitiveness to the progress of commerce and
civilization.... [A] 11 these doctrines have involved themselves into
the state of high moral refinement in which they at present exist,
not so much by the special moral elevation of particular judges, as
by the concurrent onward impetus of the whole community, which
all the judges have shared and felt the influence of.... This is what
Savigny means when he says ... that the largest portion of the un-
written law of every nation is the exact product and measure of the
national character and temper-a reflex of its life and progress.40
Not many have taken Savigny as a straight draught without some
chaser, however. We have already seen one statement by Cardozo, "It is
true if we understand it to mean that the judge in shaping the rules of
law must heed the mores of his day. It is ... false in so far as it implies
that the mores... automatically shape rules which, full grown and ready
made, are handed to the judge." 4' It is surely more mystical, and, there-
fore, perhaps more accurate, to attribute the second meaning to Savigny.
Maybe he did mean that the VoZksgeist somehow settles into the con-
sciousness of the jurist and thereby he feels the necessity which people at
large would be able to feel had not law become so complex.
I do not choose to take that course, however, since a box canyon would
39 GRAY, op. cit. supra note 37, at 92.
4 0 DixoN, JOURNAL Op JURISPRUDENCE 312 (1874), quoted in CARTm, LAW, ITS
ORIGIN, GROWTH AND FUNTION 329 n.1 (1907).
41 CGARozo, op. cit. supra note 9, at 104.
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be its resting place, and mysticism, though fascinating, is not very en-
lightening in the present context. Furthermore, even some of Savigny's
critics have chosen the first alternative. Julius Stone has said that if the
jurist-representation theory is to be accepted, then it is the only way in
which the law can develop and grow. This places a very heavy burden on
the jurists-scholars, lawyers, and judges alike. This burden can be met
only by attention to the contemporary social facts, the study and ac-
ceptance, perhaps, of the voice of the people. But, says Stone, and it is a
very large "but," responsibility was not accepted, the attention was
not given, and the theory fails in practice.42 Stone is right in one respect
if Savigny's theory is taken as an absolute. If accepted literally, the jurist-
representation theory does give the only way for legal growth. But again
I must ask the critics not to throw out the baby with the bath water. Law
can grow in other ways, but it can also grow by the works of the jurists.
It is true that some judges have not accepted the responsibility placed
upon them, but others have. The common law tradition is too great to be
treated cavalierly.
Although he does not mention Savigny directly, Warren Seavey has
provided an answer to the objection that the theory does not show how
the law can grow.
The common law was and should remain as the response of the
judges to the civilization of the times in view of its history. There is
no principle of common law which prevents the weeding out of
historical anachronisms or the correction of judicial errors, and this
without resort to Parliament. The judges have at times succeeded
in making changes without appearing to do so.... In whatever
manner the result has been accomplished, it is clear that the com-
mon law has moved with the development of economic needs and
judicial insight.
43
The judges, the legal scholars and the lawyers, then, are the ones who
can and will get the dragon out of his cave for killing or taming.
In a continuation of what has become one of the most famous of legal
quotations, Holmes expressed what I like to believe is at the heart of
Savigny's idea.
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The
felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political the-
ories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the
4 2 SToNE, op. cit. supra note 14, at 447.
43 Seavey, Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co.: Negligent Misrepresentation by Ac-
countants, 67 L.Q. RFv. 466,468 (1951).
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prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a
good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by
which men should be governed.-
The role of the judge is to discover, and follow, so far as he can, the sub-
stance of the law which at a given time corresponds with what is under-
stood to be convenient-not in the sense of easiness, but in the sense of
the ideas prevailing in the nation.45
Cardozo has buttressed his belief that his first alternative is true. When,
for example, norms or standards of behavior in the commercial field
change, then the rule of law which corresponded to the old norms will be
changed by the same forces or tendencies which brought the law into cor-
respondence in the first place. What is true of business is true of morals.
Manners and customs are at least a source of law.
The judge, so far as freedom of choice is given to him, tends to a
result that attaches legal obligation to the folkways, the norms or
standards of behavior exemplified in the life about him.... The
pressure of society invests new forms of conduct in the minds of the
multitude with the sanction of moral obligation, and the same pres-
sure working upon the mind of the judge invests them finally
through his action with the sanction of the law.46
In short, "[The judges] are interpreters of the social mind, its will, its
expectation, its desires. ' 4
7
The emphasis placed by the later "sociological" school of law on public
policy, social pressures, the people's feeling of right as against the dead
letter of statute or precedent, can be traced, at least in a germinal state,
to Savigny's teachings.48 The historical school established the organic
growth of institutions and rules, and substituted for rationalistic concepts
a wider view of individual and social psychology. The two schools have
been contrasted, but many who profess to use the historical method ac-
tually use more of the sociological than the professed adherents of that
theory. Although members of the historical school may have exaggerated
the "nonvolitional" element in the development of the law, they do not
exact blind adherence to the past, but insist that law is the expression of
4 4 
HOLmES, THE ComMoN LAw 1 (1881).
45 See BIDDLE, JusTIcE HOLMES, NATUnAL LAw, AND THE SUPRFME COURT 23 (1961).
46 CAnuozo, op. cit. supra note 8, at 15-18.
47 Id. at48.
48 See e.g., FwIDMAI-N, LGAL THEORY 135, 139 (4th ed. 1960); POUND, INTERPRE-
TATIONS Op LEGAL HISTORY 18 (1930); STONE, op. cit. supra note 14, at 431, 447; VINo-
GRADOFF, op. cit supra note 30, at 134.
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the convictions of the present. 49 The Volksgeist may be found in the pre-
vailing standards of utility and welfare.50 Even John Austin, who called
the Vocation "specious but hollow,"'" said that Jeremy Bentham belonged
to the historical school in one sense. A body of law cannot be assumed
a priori, but "must be founded on experience of the subjects and objects
with which law is conversant.
' 5 2
Leon Green, who likely would deny belonging to any "school," has ex-
pressed his ideas of the importance of public policy, social pressures, etc.,
in the terms of "we the people." "We the people" are a party to every
lawsuit.5 3 The court determines issues of law and fact, and it is in that
determination that "we the people" exert out influence, even though little
formal presentation of our views may have been made. Judge and jury,
being of "us," have within themselves a feeling of our desires and in-
terests.
They are a part of our environment as are we ourselves and draw
their daily sustenance from it, and they cannot ignore their environ-
ment which is limitless in time and content. Its influence is as pull-
ing on us and on them as the gravitation of the earth is on all objects
within its environment and is as difficult to overcome. But perhaps
unlike gravitation it is constantly kept in flux by the changes in
our desires and needs.... Thus it is that jurors and judges do their
work as it were through our eyes, or at least with those of us inter-
ested in their work always looking over their shoulders, nodding our
heads in approval, or shaking them in disapproval. 4
It is difficult to add anything to this as a modern portrayal of the theory
that the jurist represents the people in the development and progress of
the law.
49 CARDozo, THE GRowTr oF THE LAW 105 (1924).
50 Ibid.
5 1 AusTIN, JURISPRUDENCE 666 (5th ed. 1911). Austin dismissed Savigny's abhorrence
of codification thus:
But the truth seems to be that Savigny's dislike to the codification is not the
effect of his own arguments, or of any arguments, but of a natural antipathy
to the French (who were long hated in Germany because they behaved in-
famously there), transferred by a natural association from the French to their
code, and from the French code to all codes.
AUSTIN, op. cit. supra at 679. It is interesting to note that he did not condemn all of
Savigny's works. He called Das Recht des Besitzes "of all books upon law, the most
consummate and masterly; and of all books which I pretend to know accurately, the
least alloyed with error and imperfection." AUSTIN, PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DE-
TEuirDq. lxxxvifi (2d ed. 1861).
5
2 AusTIN, JuRispnDENcE 679 (5th ed. 1911).
.3 See Green, Tort Law Public Law in Disguise, 38 TExAS L. RBv. 1 (1959).
54 Id. at 3.
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B. Ministry of Justice
Another area in which the idea of jurist-representation is alive today is
that of professional responsibility. Savigny proposed three things as neces-
sary in the achievement of a good legal system.55 The first is a body of
authorities: precedents, legal writings, historical studies, which we can
put to one side in the present context. The second is a proper "ministry
of justice," to which we shall return shortly. The third is good forms of
procedure. It is interesting to note that Savigny would allow, indeed, rely
on, legislation to accomplish the third-one of the few instances of such.
How much more he would have approved of the current practice of al-
lowing the courts themselves, with the constant aid of the bar, to estab-
lish and maintain their own procedural rules!
The second necessity is of primary concern. He proposed that a free
communication between the legal scholars at the university law schools
and the judges would be an excellent means of establishing the proper
balance of theory and practice which would administer justice benefi-
cially.5 6 This connection of practice with a strong, vital, progressive the-
ory would be an ideal means of keeping talented men on the bench. The
profession as a whole should assume a scientific character, and by the
work of all, the law would develop in the correct manner, and the admin-
istration of justice would be complete.
1. THE LEGAL PROFESSION
Much time and many words have been expended recently in discus-
sions of the role of the legal profession in modern society.57 A similar con-
clusion is reached by most, if not all, of those interested-the lawyer, the
law teacher, the judge and the bar as a group have an individual and a
collective responsibility for the administration of justice. That the lawyer
has a duty to represent his client with all of the legal means at his dis-
posal does not relieve him from the duty of improving those means.
5 8 If
some of the things which legally may be done for a client are suspect in
the lawyer's mind, he should neither refuse to do them, for this would be
a failure to properly represent his client, nor should he ignore them after
use, for that would be a failure to properly represent the people in the
55 VocATroN 130.
6 VocAToTN 149.
57 See, e.g., ScHw nTz, CASES ON PRoFESsoNAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE ADmINIS-
$s'R.ATIoN op GumiiNAL JUSTIcE (1961).
58 See Thode, The Ethical Standard for the Advocate, 39 TE A.s L. R'Ev. 575 (1961).
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administration of justice. "[Aifter the case is over, if some of the weapons
or practices are not for the good of the government,... [the lawyer] is
bound by an even stronger obligation, because now he is acting in his
capacity as favored citizen of high rank, to use all his available effort to
aid in mending, or abolishing the defects."5 9
Granted that Gray is correct,60 and the people do not know what the
law is, the place of the legal profession, of the jurists, if you like, assumes
greater proportions. If the law has become so involved and so complex
that the average layman has not even a doubtful acquaintance with it,
then someone must accept the responsibility for its care and maintenance.
If the legal profession does not have the job of superintending the devel-
opment of the law, then who does? Organized bars throughout the coun-
try have been, and are being influential in improving the legal systems
of our nation and states. In this connection we should turn once again to
Cardozo.
His proposal, in a paper whose title doubtless came from the Vocation,
6
1
is directed toward the same idea as that of Savigny, a proper "ministry of
justice." As has been mentioned, Savigny believed that upon the appear-
ance of the jurist-representative, the law took on a twofold character, po-
litical and technical.6 2 With some possibility of departing from Savigny's
meaning, we can substitute public and private, respectively, for his terms.
Cardozo's plea was for a group to oversee the growth and development of
the private law. "The courts are not helped as they could and ought to be
in the adaptation of law to justice."6 3 In the public field, state officials fol-
low defects in the law by immediate suggestions for legislative reform,
but the private field has no caretaker. When a series of judicial decisions
has progressed to a point where it becomes obvious that the result is
wrong, something should be done.4 Unlike Savigny, who might have
thrown up his hands in despair at the inexorable march of history, and in
any event would have the courts themselves trace the lineage of a rule
to find an organic principle, and throw it out if none were found,6' Car-
dozo suggested that legislative reform was the proper remedy. The tool
59 Stayton, Cum Honore Officium, 19 TEx. B.J. 765, 766 (1956). For an excellent ex-
ample of this principle, see the incident involving Thomas Talford discussed in Pro-
fessional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A.J. 1159, 1162 (1958)_
60 See text accompanying notes 37-39 supra.
6 1 PATtrasoN, Juis'a~unDEcE 413 n.41 (1953).
62 See text accompanying note 34 supra.
63 Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 I-.nv. L. Rpm. 113 (1921).
64 Id. at 116.
65 VOCAorq 137.
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to inform the legislature of such needs was to be "The Ministry of Jus-
tice." This body, to be composed of members of law faculties, judges, and
representatives of the bar, would be the means of close communication
between the requirements of the law and the legislature.6 6 Although the
body charged with the actual reform is different from that proposed by
Savigny, we should not lose sight of the similarities of the suggestions.
Each calls for close communication. Each calls for interest and work by
bench, bar and law faculties. Each has the same end in view.
2. LEGAL SCHOLARS
That members of law faculties and other legal scholars work diligently
on the improvement of the law cannot be doubted. The profusion of legal
periodicals, hornbooks, treatises, and the like, is growing into Herculean
proportions-nearly as fast as the flood of advance sheets. But has there
been any real communication with the courts? Some examples may be
observed to see how this branch of the legal profession has served to affect
the development of the law.
6 1
The first is the impact upon the law of torts brought about by the pub-
lication of an article on the right of privacy.s Courts have acknowledged
thedebt owed to the authors, and although neither was a member of a law
faculty at the time, no one should be so parochial as to doubt their legal
scholarship. "This right, first brought forcefully to the attention of the
profession in the year 1890 by an article... by Louis D. Brandeis ... and
Samuel D. Warren.... ."" "All comment upon the right of privacy must
stem from the famous article by Warren and Brandeis on The Bight of
Privacy .... ,,70 And it has been said, "the article by Warren and Brandeis
'enjoys the unique distinction of having initiated and theoretically out-
lined a new field of jurisprudence'.1'
71
The second example is of more recent vintage, and perhaps for that
reason has not enjoyed the notice accorded the first. An article appeared
66 Cardozo, supra note 63, at 124. It should be noted that as a result of this suggestion,
the New York Commission on Law Reform was founded in 1944. N.Y. LGISLATIVE LAW
§§ 70-72.
67 
In an interesting switch, an article has been published which was originally written
as an appellate opinion, but rejected by a majority of the court. Stayton, Apportionment
and the Ghost of a Rejected View, 32 TE-xAS L. Rnv. 682 (1954).
68 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 IIARv. L. REv. 193 (1890).
69 Hinish v. Meier & Frank Co., 166 Ore. 482,485, 113 P.2d 438,440 (1941).
70 Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 808 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S.
711 (1940).
71 Annot., 138 A.L.R. 22, 25 (1942).
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in 1956 outlining a "proposed" new implied covenant in oil and gas
leases.7 2 This article was almost immediately followed by a case which
adopted the proposal, with due credit given to the originator.73 Although
a higher court, in a later case 7 4 has rejected the view, other courts have
adopted the new covenant, and much discussion has been aroused.7 5
The most striking example of recent times appears in an Oregon de-
cision.7 The court had invited briefs on the question of abandoning the
doctrine of proximate cause, noting in its invitation that the doctrine
should perhaps be replaced by the approach to causal relation espoused
by Leon Green. Several of his writings were suggested as references for
the briefs.77 Although the majority of the court was not ready to take the
step proposed, a substantial minority adopted Green's views completely."
3. POSTSCRIPT
The responsibility of the legal profession is a large one. "The reason
why it is a profession, why people will pay lawyers to argue for them or
72 Meyers, The Implied Covenant of Further Exploration, 34 TEXAs L. REV. 553
(1956).
73 Willingham v. Bryson, 294 S.W.2d 421 (Tex. Civ. App.-Ft. Worth 1956), 35
TEXAs L. R-v. 617 (1957).
74 Clifton v. Koontz, 160 Tex. 82,325 S.W.2d 684 (1959).
75 See, e.g., BROWN, TrE LAW OF OIL AND GAS LEASES (1958); Meyers, The Covenant
of Further Exploration. A Comment 37 TEXAS L. REv. 179 (1958); Brown, The Pro-
posed New Covenant of Further Exploration. Reply to Comment, 37 TEXAS L. REv. 303
(1958); Galvin, Meyers v. Brown-Jurisprudence in Action, 7 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 589
(1960); Meyers & Williams, The Implied Duty to Explore Further: Recent Texas
Developments, 41 TEXAs L. REv. 789 (1963); Smith, The Implied Duty to Explore
Further: Recent Texas Developments-A Disagreement, 42 TEXAs L. REv. 199 (1963).
See also Railroad Comm'n v. Williams, 163 Tex. 370, 356 S.W.2d 131 (1961), re-
lying in part on Hardwicke, Oil-Well Spacing Regulations and Protection of Property
Rights in Texas, 31 TEXAS L. REv. 99 (1952), and Myers, "Common Ownership and
Control" in Spacing Cases, 31 TEXAS L. REv. 19 (1952). Of course, sometimes the com-
munication is not so loud and clear. See the rejection of "the fantastic Charles Meyers
theories" in Coloma Oil & Gas Corp. v. Railroad Comm'n, 163 Tex. 483, 358 S.W.2d
566, 575 (1962) (dissenting opinion). There has been some speculation as to whether
the adjective applies to the professor or his theories.
76 Dewey v. A. F. Klaveness & Co., 233 Ore. 515,379 P.2d 560 (1963).
77 Id. at 563. See also Strakos v. Gehring, 360 S.W.2d 787, 803 (Tex. 1962), 41 TEXAS
L. REv. 599 (1963), using the analysis of tort cases suggested by Green, The Causal Re-
lation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MicH. L. REv. 543 (1962).
7 8 This section would not be complete, particularly in the issue of the Review dedi-
cated to him, without mention of the monumental work of Judge Stayton, Professor of
Law at the University of Texas for nearly forty years. His efforts, together with those
of Judge James P. Alexander, were by far the most influential in drafting and assuring
the passage of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
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to advise them, is that in societies like ours the command of the public
force is intrusted to the judges in certain cases, and the whole power of




Savigny and the historical school of law have been praised, fairly criti-
cized, and much maligned. Certainly his writings must be taken with the
proverbial grain of salt, but there is at least a kernel of truth, of practical-
ity, or modern value, perhaps improved by the salt. An example has been
given of two possible uses of the historical method in the judicial process,
which serves well as a conclusion to this paper. In an action in New York
for criminal conversation, the question for decision was whether or not
the suit could be maintained by a woman. The appellate division held
that it could not, citing cases back to the time of Lord Coke. The Court of
Appeals reversed.
We did not ignore these precedents, but we held them inconclusive.
Social, political, and legal reforms had changed the relations between
the sexes, and put woman and man upon a plane of equality. De-
cisions founded upon the assumption of a bygone inequality were
unrelated to present-day realities, and ought not to be permitted
to prescribe a rule of life. The historical method was the organon of
judgment in each court, but its application led in each to opposite
results. One court, in its interpretation of legal history, was satis-
fied to treat as finalities the precedents of ancient year books. The
other found a stream of thought, a tendency, a movement forward to
a goal. Which, then, is the truer use of the historical method? Which
exhibits the saner and the sounder loyalty? Shall the significance of
events be determined by transporting them to our own time and
viewing them as if they were the product of our own day and
thought, or by viewing them as of the time of their occurrence, the
product of their era, the expression of its beliefs and habits? 0
Would not Savigny have preferred the method of the higher court? Truly,
for law there is no moment of absolute cessation.-
79 Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HAirv. L. R v. 457 (1897).
80 CA~ozo, op. cit. supra note 49, at 105-06.
8 1 See text accompanying note 16 supra.
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